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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear security

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

Importance of strengthening nuclear security implementation

1. In the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference stresses the importance of nuclear security and formulates several action points related to the non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the action plan. States are encouraged to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (action 40) and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date (action 41).

2. The actual application of nuclear security and physical protection measures remains a fundamental responsibility of States, as has been established, inter alia, in the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and referred to in *Nuclear Security Fundamentals: Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime* (IAEA Nuclear Security Series document No. 20). This includes taking appropriate measures for preventing non-State actors from obtaining nuclear materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. It is incumbent upon each State to establish the appropriate legal framework, a robust governance structure and other measures it sees fit to advance nuclear security.

3. The members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative support the use of best practices gathered from the expert community, and recognize IAEA as a key player in collecting these best practices, developing them into nuclear security guidance and providing specific assistance to States. In this context, IAEA offers a number of services including the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to assist States in consolidating their nuclear security needs into comprehensive plans. The IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications contain objectives and essential elements of a

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State's nuclear security regime, along with recommendations and additional implementing guidance. Nuclear Security Series document No. 20, on the objective and essential elements of a State's nuclear security regime, is endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors and reflects broad international consensus. The IAEA recommendation document No. 13 on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (also published as INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), document No. 14 on radioactive material and associated facilities, and document No. 15 on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control were prepared by nuclear security experts from more than 40 member States. In addition, the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources provides non-binding international guidance for the lifecycle control of high-risk radioactive sources, and 120 States to date have made a political commitment to follow its guidance.

4. It would be a considerable step forward if States were to actively apply and implement the IAEA recommendations nationally and declare such intent publicly. This would significantly strengthen nuclear security worldwide and bolster confidence at national and international level. It would by no means alter the character of IAEA guidance into a legally binding instrument. States remain fully responsible for the ways and means of the implementation. This is the reason why the so-called implementing guides and technical guidance publications of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series should remain at the disposal of States, but would not be part of the recommended national implementation since their applicability remains dependent upon the legal and regulatory system of a State.

Securing nuclear materials for military purposes

5. An estimated 85 per cent of the global inventory of fissile material — the larger part of all highly enriched uranium and about half of the plutonium — has been produced for military purposes and remains outside of civilian programmes. The nuclear-weapon States have an additional responsibility to secure their stocks of nuclear materials for military purposes, including nuclear weapons and associated military facilities. It is of paramount importance that these stocks and facilities are protected at least as well as civilian nuclear materials and their associated facilities, and that the States involved affirm this.

6. In this context, the 2015 Review Conference should recommend that States:

- Subscribe to the fundamental principles set forth in IAEA Nuclear Security Series document No. 20 and meet the intent of the recommendations contained in Nos. 13, 14 and 15, including through the implementation and enhancement of national regulations and other government measures and arrangements
- Develop, in conjunction with IAEA, as necessary, Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to consolidate and prioritize nuclear security needs
- Continue to improve the effectiveness of their nuclear security regimes and operators' systems by conducting self-assessments, periodically hosting IPPAS missions and acting upon the recommendations identified during these reviews
- Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent

7. Additionally, the 2015 Review Conference should recommend that, in order to promote confidence in the effectiveness of security for non-civilian nuclear

materials, the nuclear-weapon States and non-States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

- Affirm that nuclear materials in the military realm are at least as well protected, or that nuclear security is at least as effective for non-civilian nuclear materials as for civilian materials and, in this regard, declare that internationally agreed guidelines for physical protection (notably IAEA Nuclear Security Series document No. 13) will be taken into account to enhance the effectiveness of protecting non-civilian nuclear materials
- Publish the legal and regulatory framework related to the security of non-civilian nuclear materials on the understanding that no confidential information will be disclosed or confidentiality arrangements violated

NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.27

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Working paper submitted by Iraq on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States

I. Background and developments

1. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted an action plan for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East through a mechanism that included three main approaches:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, would convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (the postponed 2012 conference);

(b) That conference would be the first step in a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;

(c) A facilitator would be appointed in order to prepare the conference, and a host Government would be designated.

2. The Arab States viewed that mandate arising from the 2010 Review Conference as a positive development, the first since the 1995 resolution.

3. However, immediately following the 2010 document on the Middle East, it became clear that some of the organizing parties were reluctant to honour their obligations; they made negative statements that were inconsistent with the responsibilities that they had accepted. The Arab States wish to highlight a number of negative developments that eventually led to the present unacceptable situation:

(a) It took over 16 months to select the facilitator and the host Government. That time was wasted without justification or benefit, whereas the choice could have been made within the first month.

(b) Since the 2010 document was adopted, some of the organizers began to repeat that Israel had not participated in negotiating the document and was not a

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party to the Treaty; that it was therefore not a concerned party and had no obligation under the agreements; and that the Arab States should make concessions in order to persuade Israel to participate.

The Arab States are surprised at that negative stance of some of the organizers. It is as though they had suddenly discovered, after the document was adopted, that Israel was not a party to the Treaty and that that situation impeded the fulfilment of their obligations. If that was the case, why did the parties accept responsibility for implementing those steps? Indeed, why did they present the 1995 resolution on the Middle East as the cornerstone for the deal to extend the Treaty indefinitely?

(c) Some of the organizers focused on the need to add new elements and topics to the agenda of the conference, thereby removing it from the agreed context and contravening the clear mandate and terms of reference adopted by the 2010 Conference. That would open the door to renegotiating all previous agreements, all on the pretext that Israel was not a party to the original Treaty.

(d) The Arab States were surprised at the organizers' announcement that the conference would be postponed, an announcement made without consulting them or setting an alternative date. The Arab States were also puzzled by the conflicting statements made by each organizer.

(e) Since the end of the second session of the Preparatory Committee, the facilitator and the organizers have convened consultative meetings with the relevant regional actors in order to prepare for the conference. The Arab States deplored the delay. The consultative meetings (Glion, Glion 2 and Glion 3) took place in unclear circumstances: they lacked a specific agenda and were held outside the United Nations framework. Nevertheless, the Arab States decided to participate constructively in order to prevent any party from holding them responsible for the failure of the talks at any stage.

(f) After the conclusion of the three Glion meetings on 4 and 5 February 2014, the facilitator announced that two preparatory meetings would be held in Geneva before the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference. The Arab States were puzzled by the facilitator's announcement that the meetings would be postponed until after the third session of the Preparatory Committee, with the pretext that too many other meetings and conferences on disarmament and security were scheduled in March and April. That would imply that the mission of the facilitator and the organizers was merely to organize an international meeting among numerous others, that this particular meeting was not a priority for them, and that their primary mission did not take precedence over any other engagements or meetings.

(g) Despite the delay in convening the postponed 2012 conference, the Arab States took the initiative of writing letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations endorsing the declaration of the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Iran followed suit, meaning that Israel, alone in the Middle East region, has not sent such a letter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations informed the General Assembly of this matter in a letter dated 6 March 2014.

II. The Arab position

4. In the context of the foregoing, the Arab States wish to make the following points clear for the last time before the 2015 Review Conference:

- In the last three years, the Arab States have made a number of concessions and contributed positively to attempts to ensure the success of preparations to convene the postponed 2012 conference. For this reason, under no circumstances will the Arab States be held responsible for the failure of others. Nor will they accept any assertion that the failure was caused by the inability of the States of the region to arrive at an understanding or to compromise.
- The Arab States will continue to cooperate with the facilitator and the organizing parties in the period leading up to the 2015 Review Conference, which the Arab States consider to be a crossroads in the process, so long as the preparatory process remains within the context of the mandate and terms of reference adopted by the 2010 Review Conference.
- If the postponed 2012 conference is not convened and serious negotiations on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East have not begun before the 2015 Review Conference, the Arab States will take the necessary measures to protect their interests.

III. Recommendations

5. The Arab States therefore call upon the third session of Preparatory Committee and the States Parties to the Treaty to affirm the following points:

(a) That the delay in the preparations to convene the postponed 2012 conference is deplorable;

(b) That convening the postponed 2012 conference is no longer a regional demand, but rather has become an international responsibility, and that the decision to convene the conference was arrived at by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference;

(c) That the organizers are obligated to abide by the mandate and terms of reference stipulated in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and that no issues extraneous to negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East are to be introduced;

(d) That the postponed 2012 conference must be convened as soon as possible, so that the implementation of its outcomes can be reviewed and a comprehensive report can be submitted 2015 NPT Review Conference;

(e) That implementation of the agreements reached in 2010 regarding the Middle East is one of the essential keys to the success of the 2015 Review Conference.

Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 April 2014
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Strengthening international nuclear non-proliferation

Working paper submitted by Japan

1. To achieve the goal of "a world free of nuclear weapons", the spread of nuclear weapons must be prevented. Specifically, efforts for nuclear non-proliferation are essential. These efforts are designed to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States as well as the circumstances that lead to the emergence of such countries.

2. In this context, as a new concept in the policy of the Government of Japan in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, we have introduced "three preventions": (a) prevention of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States; (b) prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapons-related materials and technologies; and (c) prevention of nuclear terrorism.

Prevention of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States

3. The first pillar of this new concept is the prevention of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. Preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States is one of the most important pillars of Japan's non-proliferation policy.

4. The continued development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear and missile programmes poses a grave threat to regional and global peace and stability. In coordination with the United States of America, the Republic of Korea and other countries concerned, Japan strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete actions towards its denuclearization. We will never accept possession of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under any circumstances.

5. The Iranian nuclear issue is also a matter of concern for Japan. Japan, in various diplomatic exchanges, has strongly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and to fully cooperate with IAEA to remove international concerns regarding its nuclear activities. Japan will, in coordination with the international community, continue to be actively engaged in international efforts in the pursuit of a final and comprehensive resolution to the issue.

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6. The IAEA safeguards, which serve as practical measures to detect the diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to military uses as well as to detect clandestine nuclear activities, are a fundamental component in the international non-proliferation regime.

7. As the country receiving the greatest number of IAEA inspections in the world and one of the pioneers in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with this long-standing knowledge and experience, we will continue to work with the international community so that all concerned countries conclude the Additional Protocol in order for safeguards to be further strengthened.

Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapons-related materials and technologies

8. The second pillar of this policy is the prevention of the proliferation of materials and technologies that could contribute to nuclear-weapons development. In order to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, it is important to implement, in addition to the above, export controls for the prevention of the procurement of nuclear-related materials by parties pursuing the possession of nuclear weapons.

9. In recent years, along with their economic development, Asian countries have been acquiring the capacity to produce materials and technologies that could be diverted to the development of nuclear weapons as well as missiles as a means of delivery.

10. Meanwhile, illegal procurement activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated, utilizing front companies and making use of transit points in Asia. Therefore, there is an increased risk that these countries might export such materials and technologies to countries of concern without recognizing that they could be diverted to nuclear-weapons development.

11. It is also a fact, however, that there is still recognition among Asian countries that export controls could impede trade and investment, and that non-proliferation efforts may, therefore, pose obstacles to economic growth. With this in mind, Japan is determined to reinforce the international non-proliferation network by strengthening diplomatic cooperation with like-minded countries, such as the United States and Australia. Japan will work tirelessly to explain to Asian countries that the strengthening of export controls fosters confidence in the reliability of trade or investment partners, and creates a favourable environment for further economic growth rather than impeding trade and investment.

Prevention of nuclear terrorism

12. The third pillar is the prevention of nuclear terrorism. Along with the above-mentioned measures, it is also extremely important to prevent "nuclear terrorism", which is an act of terror by non-State actors, such as terrorist organizations, utilizing nuclear and other radioactive materials.

13. Strengthening nuclear security is important from the following three perspectives: (a) Japan's national security; (b) maintaining public order; and (c) promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. If many countries build and strengthen their capacity to counter nuclear terrorism, confidence-building among nations will be promoted in the field of international security.

14. Japan will continue to contribute actively to strengthening global nuclear security and counter-terrorism activities as one of the countries with the most advanced nuclear technology through various international forums, including IAEA.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Joint ministerial statement released at the eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative held in Hiroshima, Japan, on 11 and 12 April 2014

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

The members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative — Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates — have the honour to submit the joint ministerial statement adopted at the eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative held in Hiroshima, Japan, on 11 and 12 April 2014.

Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative: joint ministerial statement Hiroshima, Japan (12 April 2014)

1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative countries — Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates — are gathered here in Hiroshima, where an atomic bomb was dropped for the first time in human history and which witnessed first-hand the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of an atomic bombing that last even to the present day. We were very deeply touched by the testimonies of atomic bomb survivors (*hibakushas*) and reinforce our commitment to achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, we invite the world's political leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, to witness the consequences with their own eyes.

2. We are committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and as the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We stress the importance of

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universal adherence to the Treaty and call upon all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it immediately as non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. We reaffirm our commitment and shared purpose as declared in our first ministerial statement in September 2010, which is to take forward the consensus outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to jointly advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes. We reaffirm our commitment to contributing actively to the 2015 Review Conference, including the upcoming third session of the Preparatory Committee, by submitting working papers to promote discussion and understanding on the following subjects: nuclear disarmament in the era following the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), increased transparency in nuclear disarmament, de-alerting, nuclear security, a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

4. With the 2015 Review Conference fast approaching, we urge all States parties to comply fully with the obligations and commitments, particularly the full and prompt implementation of all the actions in the 2010 action plan. For its part, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has been devoting, and will continue to devote, attention to elements for consideration in a consensus outcome document for the 2015 Review Conference. In our view, the 2015 Review Conference should review the implementation of the 2010 action plan and, with an eye towards the next 2020 review cycle, seek to strengthen all three pillars of the Treaty — nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a diverse cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States, we can play a constructive and proactive role in bridging diverse positions to help craft a successful outcome at the 2015 Review Conference, with progress across all the pillars of the Treaty.

5. We reaffirm that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, we stress the need for a systematic and continued reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, by all States possessing nuclear weapons, in a pragmatic and step-by-step approach, with a view to their total elimination.

6. We recall that the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, thereby generating a process that would lead to their elimination. At the 2010 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to unequivocally accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, and committed themselves to accelerating progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

7. In this regard, we welcome bilateral disarmament measures by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, such as those contained in their New START Treaty, and encourage them to continue discussions on follow-on measures to the New START Treaty to achieve even deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals, towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We were encouraged by the proposals of the President of the United States, Barack Obama, in

his speech in Berlin in June 2013, in which he stated the intention of the United States to seek additional negotiated cuts with the Russian Federation and move beyond cold war nuclear postures. We expect the proposals to lead to progress in negotiations on comprehensive reductions of all types of nuclear weapons.

8. While recognizing the positive impact of unilateral and bilateral reductions, we believe that they do not replace multilateral negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of all types of nuclear weapons.

9. We are deeply concerned about the reported build-up of nuclear arsenals, against the clear intent of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We urge those not yet engaged in nuclear disarmament efforts to reduce their arsenals with the objective of their total elimination.

10. Increasing the transparency of information about nuclear forces has also been an issue of great importance to the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be verified nor would States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to use an agreed standard reporting form to meet their obligations to report their disarmament undertakings to the upcoming third session of the Preparatory Committee. We urge them to build upon this effort by submitting further substantive, timely and meaningful reports at future Treaty meetings on their nuclear disarmament undertakings to fulfil their commitments under article VI of the Treaty.

11. Quantitative reductions should be accompanied by steps towards reducing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security strategies and military doctrines. These steps are important contributions towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament and will be mutually reinforcing with further quantitative reductions. While we acknowledge the steps that have been taken in this regard, we urge nuclear-weapon States to reduce further the role of nuclear weapons and urge others who have not done so to start reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and military doctrines.

12. De-alerting nuclear forces is also important, not only as a step towards a world free of nuclear weapons but also to avoid and reduce the risk of catastrophic humanitarian consequences from any unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to take concrete and meaningful steps, whether unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally, to implement actions 5(e) and 5(f) of the 2010 action plan, which, inter alia, call for reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.

13. We are deeply concerned and frustrated with the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. We regret that the Conference has failed to fulfil its mandate as the single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum of the international community for more than 18 years. It is time for the Conference's member States to take bold steps towards fulfilling the Conference's mandate and resume negotiations.

14. As an essential step towards a world free of nuclear weapons, the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and universally and effectively verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (fissile material cut-off treaty) that

serves both disarmament and non-proliferation purposes remains a priority. We welcome and look forward to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on this issue, which ended its first session on 11 April 2014 in Geneva. We urge the Conference to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as soon as possible. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, all nuclear-weapon States and other States in possession of nuclear weapons should declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

15. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is also an essential component for achieving nuclear disarmament. We welcome the recent ratification of the Treaty by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq and Niue, bringing the total number of ratifications to 162. Although the Treaty, 18 years after opening up for signatories, has yet to come into force, we believe that the prohibition of nuclear tests as envisioned by the Treaty has become a de facto international norm. However, without the legally-binding effect of the entry into force of the Treaty, such a norm remains fragile. We therefore urge those remaining States whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty to sign and ratify it without delay.

16. We are committed to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We consider the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, in combination with an Additional Protocol, to be the international verification standard and call upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude and implement an Additional Protocol without delay. We stand ready to share our experiences and best practices, as well as legal and practical assistance, in cooperation with IAEA.

17. Furthermore, we underscore the crucial role of export controls to support the fulfilment of nuclear non-proliferation obligations under paragraph 2 of article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We encourage all States to establish, develop and maintain appropriate and effective national export controls for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods, equipment and technology. We stand ready to share our individual experiences in the field of export control with other States.

18. Recognizing the serious threat of nuclear terrorism, we reaffirm our commitment to working together to strengthen nuclear security, including by fully implementing relevant international requirements. We welcome The Hague Communiqué adopted at the third Nuclear Security Summit, which was held in the Netherlands on 24 and 25 March 2014. The members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Imitative fully support the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit, which are to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. We also reaffirm the essential responsibility and the central role of IAEA in the international nuclear security architecture.

19. We strongly condemn the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which undermine the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime, as well as pose a great threat to regional and global peace and stability. We condemn and express grave concern at the ballistic missile launches conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 26 March 2014 (local time), following the launches on 3 March 2014. These launches are clear violations of the relevant Security Council resolutions. We strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its commitments under the

2005 Six-Party Talks joint statement and with its obligations under all the relevant Security Council resolutions, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and to return to compliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, we urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from further provocative actions, including ballistic missile launches, nuclear tests or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We also deplore the announcement and the efforts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to readjust and restart the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and urge the country to cease all nuclear activities immediately.

20. We welcome the start of the implementation of the first steps of the joint plan of action agreed with the Islamic Republic of Iran and hope that the ongoing negotiations of the Governments of France, Germany, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (E3+3) with the Islamic Republic of Iran will lead to the final and comprehensive resolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear issue. In particular, we urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to swiftly and steadily implement measures such as the ratification and implementation of its Additional Protocol, with a view to removing international concerns regarding its nuclear activities. In addition, we urge the Islamic Republic of Iran to fulfil the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors. In this context, we welcome the Framework for Cooperation and the steps implemented to date, and fully support the efforts of the E3+3 Governments and IAEA. In particular, while respecting the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant obligations, we support the efforts of IAEA to resolve international concerns and all outstanding issues regarding Iranian nuclear activities, including possible military dimensions, and we call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA in this respect.

21. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, as a group of non-nuclear-weapon States committed to promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is following with grave concern the situation in Ukraine, which has been the subject of intensive discussions among ourselves as well as at the General Assembly. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expects international obligations and commitments to be respected, including the 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum).

22. We emphasize that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, is an important measure in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process. We therefore call on all nuclear-weapon States to recognize the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those established by the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok, by securing ratifications of relevant protocols without reservations contrary to the object and purpose of those Treaties.

23. We regret that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which is an essential and integral part of the final outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences, has still not been held. We welcome the ongoing consultations among

the relevant parties to address outstanding issues and call for the earliest possible convening of a successful conference with the participation of all the States of the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. We support the facilitator in his efforts to realize this outcome and call upon the States in the region to engage in a spirit of constructive cooperation that will lead to an inclusive, substantive and goal-oriented conference and follow-up steps.

24. The testimonies of *hibakushas* serve as a reminder to us all of why a nuclear war should never be fought. The devastating impact of nuclear weapons has motivated humanity's aspirations to achieve and sustain the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is reflected in the first resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1946. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been reflected in numerous multilaterally negotiated instruments, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Tlatelolco Treaty, as well as in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

25. We urge all States to reiterate their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, as expressed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. In view of such consequences, it is in the interest of all nations that the nearly 69-year record of the non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

26. The catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons fundamentally underpins all work aimed at succeeding in our non-proliferation efforts and at achieving nuclear disarmament in pursuit of a more secure world, particularly through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The ongoing discussion on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should be inclusive and universal as well as a catalyst for united global action towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. For this purpose, we encourage all States to contribute actively and constructively in all forums to pursue practical and effective measures that will strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty, while dealing with diverse nuclear risks.

27. In order to foster further momentum for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, we stress the significance of spreading awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations. Through disarmament, non-proliferation education and the translation of the testimonies of *hibakushas* into multiple languages, messages have been sent to the world about the consequences of nuclear weapons. Such endeavours should continue. Efforts to deepen our understanding further of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons based on facts-based scientific studies are important. We welcome all such recent efforts, including the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in Oslo in March 2013 and in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014. In this regard, we take note of the offer of the Government of Austria and are looking forward to further discussions on the Government's plans for the next conference on this issue, which is to be held in Vienna later in 2014.

28. We recognize the significant role of civil society, and accordingly, the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education. On the margins of the Ministerial Meeting held in Hiroshima, we had a welcome opportunity to engage with civil society, including non-governmental organizations, students from Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative member States, academics and the

media. We will continue our engagement with civil society in pursuit of our common objectives.

29. We call upon all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to take part in the third Preparatory Committee in a spirit of cooperation and good faith, which would maintain the constructive atmosphere created at the previous sessions of the Preparatory Committees, and to carry that spirit forward to the 2015 Review Conference. It is the responsibility of all States parties to fulfil their commitments and obligations under the Treaty regime and to work to uphold and strengthen that regime, including by achieving a successful outcome at the 2015 Review Conference.

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Addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as the foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico and Vienna

Working paper submitted by Austria

1. One of the key goals of the international community in the negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the driving force of the Treaty's subsequent success in achieving its high level of universality, is encapsulated in the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty: "Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples ... ".

2. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gave specific focus, inter alia, to this issue in its consensual conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions (2010 action plan) by expressing "its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons". Moreover, the Conference resolved in action 1 of the action plan that "All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons." Thus, by advancing the key goal of the Treaty to achieve a world without nuclear weapons and implementing action 1 of the action plan, the international community has increased its focus on addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including through international conferences specifically dedicated to this issue.

3. The Government of Norway hosted the first international conference in Oslo in March 2013. It provided an arena for the international community — including governmental experts from 128 States, international organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society — to have a facts-based discussion about the humanitarian and developmental consequences that would result from a nuclear weapon detonation and about disaster preparedness. The main conclusions were that (a) no State or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in any meaningful

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way; (b) no existing national or international emergency system would be able to provide adequate assistance to the victims; and (c) there would be serious long-term effects that would not be constrained by national borders.

4. Following this model, Mexico hosted the second international conference in Nayarit in February 2014. Experts from 146 States, international organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society confirmed the initial findings of the Oslo conference and deepened their understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, including the long-term effects on socioeconomic development and the environment, as well as on health. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear weapon use was considered to be growing globally, including the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional use. Efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons comprise multiple actions and mutually reinforcing processes such as promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, achieving a comprehensive outcome in the 2015 Review Conference and discussing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The High-level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, held in 2013, also provided positive impulses.

5. During the Nayarit conference, Austria offered to host the third international conference on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, scheduled to take place in December 2014. In his announcement for the media, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sebastian Kurz stated that: "Nuclear weapons are not only a permanent threat to all humankind but also a relic of the cold war that we must finally overcome. Nuclear disarmament is a global task and a collective responsibility. As a member State committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Austria wants to do its share to achieve the goals of this Treaty." Austria will prepare the third international conference in an inclusive manner, building upon the findings and experience of the conferences held in Oslo and Nayarit.

6. Building on the preamble of the Treaty and pursuing the Treaty's goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons as well as implementing the 2010 action plan, the broad-based and comprehensive discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that have taken place in Oslo and Nayarit — and later in Vienna in 2014 — underscore growing support to anchor the humanitarian imperative firmly in discussions about nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

7. Better awareness of the devastating humanitarian impact and consequences of nuclear weapons builds momentum for the urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament and results in greater understanding of the need to eliminate this risk. The international community has an obligation to move forward with urgency, including on the basis of article VI of the Treaty, to achieve the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. Facts-based discussions at the international conferences can assist States, together with civil society, in achieving this important result and the goal of the Treaty.

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Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Nuclear disarmament forms one of the fundamental pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the course of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty, an integrated and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place their facilities under the safeguards agreements. In return, the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover, all States parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States parties to peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner. In addition, universality of the Treaty has been assumed as a common international commitment of all States parties.

2. Since 1978, when the final document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in the disarmament agenda, the international community has had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long-sought goal, as contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 2005 Review Conference was a sad setback in this direction. As reaffirmed in the agreed action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, the practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference still constitute the basis of our deliberations on nuclear disarmament in the 2015 Review Conference.

3. With the adoption of the practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty, hopes for the implementation of the disarmament pillar of the Treaty were renewed. The implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty has become instrumental towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. In its action plan, the 2010 Review Conference emphasized the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States

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to implement the practical steps to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

4. The 2015 Review Conference shall consider national reports of the nuclear-weapon States, to be furnished in accordance with actions 5 and 20 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan, with respect to their obligations to implement article VI of the Treaty, including measures adopted by them to implement the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

5. The continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads by the nuclear-weapon States still threaten international peace and security. Despite the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as their commitment made at the 2010 Review Conference to accelerate progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising.

6. The non-entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty are among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the agreements of the 2000 Review Conference. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty and the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) do not go beyond merely decommissioning nuclear weapons, and their parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons covered under those treaties. They therefore do not abide by the principle of irreversibility, which was agreed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference and reaffirmed in action 2 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan.

7. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process. In actions 3 and 5 of the 2010 Review Conference's action plan, the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirmed their commitment to this end. In spite of that commitment, no practical steps by the nuclear-weapon States have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons.

8. Moreover, in the absence of any mechanism to verify the implementation of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations made or agreements reached regarding the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations, and in order to assure the international community of the real reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the 2015 Review Conference should establish a standing committee to ensure the implementation of the commitments made with regard to article VI obligations.

9. It should also be highlighted that any reduction of nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, should be conducted in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner. Needless to say, such reduction in nuclear

weapons can never be a substitute for the main obligation of the nuclear-weapon States, namely, the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As a first step, a real change is needed regarding the aggressive Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and a removal of the emphasis on the old doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

10. The international community rightly expects that statements on the reduction of nuclear weapons will be materialized and implemented in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite these pledges, a review of the new developments in the nuclear policy of the United States shows a reverse trend. The continued emphasis of the new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States on maintaining nuclear weapons and the obsolete deterrence policy, the plan to spend an estimated $700 billion on the modernization of American nuclear arsenals, the construction of a new facility for the production of new nuclear weapons, the lack of movement towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the raising of new excuses for keeping nuclear weapons in the new Nuclear Posture Review are clear indications of the continued policy of this State to evade its nuclear disarmament obligation.

11. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States and the Trident plan of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which provide for the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and the targeting of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, are in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its indefinite extension. More worrisome are announcements by France. It has recently announced the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals. The President of that country was quoted as saying, "French nuclear forces are a key element in Europe's security". It appears that this country, in defiance of its international obligations, is seeking new roles for its nuclear forces in order to justify their continued retention. In so doing, it even resorts to irresponsible methods, such as the manipulation of intelligence and frightening people to promote programmes that their people would otherwise not support. It is regrettable that, despite the high expectations of the international community regarding the realization of the pledges of the United States on nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons, a new extraordinary budget of tens of billions of dollars has been allocated to modernize American nuclear arsenals. The bill was a blow to all hopes created by the rhetoric of the new Administration and a big setback to the Treaty. The Nuclear Posture Review provides for using conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile systems by the United States, while this country has been claiming for a long time that the ballistic missile has no use other than as a means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

12. The Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference have the task of addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of alleviating these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nuclear weapons, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and in foreign countries.

13. Moreover, real concerns of the international community remain over the horizontal proliferation of nuclear-weapons transfers to other countries and the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the danger of using such inhumane weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Ironically, not only do some nuclear-weapon States not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals and give no real and unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, but they also threaten to use their weapons against States parties to the Treaty.

14. In accordance with article I of the Treaty, each nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly. Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries, and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. The new Nuclear Posture Review of the United States has clearly confessed such violations, namely, the deployment of American nuclear weapons in the territories of the European Union, and the Review Conference must seriously address this case of non-compliance. In the same context, the nuclear-sharing between the nuclear-weapon States and between the nuclear-weapon States and non-parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for States parties to the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance.

15. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its article III (2), states that all States are to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

16. Accordingly, the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty, without exception and with particular regard to the Israeli regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security. The United States is a non-compliant Party in its undertakings under the provisions of the Treaty by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime of Israel and by strongly supporting this regime by keeping silent in respect of the acknowledgement by the former Prime Minister of Israel of its nuclear arsenal. The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States regarding the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

17. The agreement signed by the Director of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and the Chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States, enabling the Zionist regime to access most of the available nuclear data and technology of the United States, is another example of non-compliance by the United States with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It seems that the United States is not shy about supporting that regime's

nuclear weapon programme, and the disclosed "top secret document dated 23 August 1974" clearly shows the role of the United States in equipping the Zionist regime with nuclear weapons.

18. Although the moratorium on nuclear testing (but not testing using simulations) has been maintained since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, some efforts had been under way in the United States to allocate millions of dollars to the goal of reducing to 18 months the time necessary to resume a nuclear test. This puts into question its commitment to the so-called moratorium. The international community has high expectations that the United States, as a major nuclear-weapon State, will implement its commitments under the final document of the 2000 Review Conference and the agreed action plan on nuclear disarmament of the 2010 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as one of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament.

19. While new issues such as terrorism, threats to non-proliferation and the possible role of terrorist groups in proliferation should be duly dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of preserving nuclear weapons and ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations by certain nuclear-weapon States. Specific threats may not be resolved by resorting to more dangerous weapons that would have catastrophic consequences well beyond any other threats in scope and effects. The main responsibility for nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorist groups from having access to the nuclear weapons or materials within the territory of a nuclear-weapon State or under its jurisdiction or control rests entirely with that State. Pending the total elimination of such weapons, they should take necessary measures to protect their arsenals from any theft and incident.

20. The Treaty review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and it must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference and the action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference.

21. The parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should engage in good faith in the substantive work of the 2015 Review Conference for the prompt and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty, including article VI, and the commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

22. The international community cannot wait forever to witness the total elimination of nuclear weapons. To that end, the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI.

23. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran welcomes the first ever high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, held in New York on 26 September 2013, as a concrete contribution to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. In his statement at the beginning of that meeting, His Excellency President Hassan Rouhani of the Islamic Republic of Iran, made a three-point proposals on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement which was supported by many of the participating delegates and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in

resolution 68/32 on the follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. In that resolution, the Assembly: (a) called for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction; (b) decided to convene, no later than 2018, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard; and (c) declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons devoted to furthering this objective, including through enhancing public awareness and education about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination, in order to mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

24. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran, while underscoring the importance of applying, in the adoption of the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, the principle contained in paragraph 29 of the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that "The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage", urges the Conference to agree, by consensus and without any further delay, on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that takes completely into account the security interests of all States. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. It also calls for the full implementation of resolution 68/32, in particular its call for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

25. Until the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and their unequivocal commitments undertaken at the successive Review Conferences and refrain from:

(a) Any kind of development of and research on nuclear weapons;

(b) Any threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty;

(c) Any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities;

(d) The deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries;

(e) Maintaining their nuclear weapons in the trigger-alert situation.

26. Continued lack of transparency regarding the nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States is a matter of serious concern to the States parties to the Treaty. The few pieces of news on submarine accidents leaked to the media show the scale of the dangers to international peace and security, as well as the great challenges created by the existing nuclear arsenals to the survival of mankind and the

environment. Since 2000, the collisions and failures of nuclear submarines of the United Kingdom, including HMS Superb in May 2008, have been a great source of concern for the international community and posed an immense risk to the marine environment. During this period, HMS Triumph, HMS Trafalgar and HMS Tireless had similar catastrophic incidents. In particular, in February 2009, the incident between the British nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard and the French nuclear submarine Le Triomphant in the Atlantic Ocean was of serious concern to the international community. Such cases of accidents involving nuclear weapons proved once more the righteousness of the international calls for the immediate realization of a world free from nuclear arsenals through the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

27. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the Treaty. The final document of the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed, in the second paragraph of its section on article VII, the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding and unconditional security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the Review Conference.

28. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran stresses that efforts for the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should be pursued by the international community as a matter of priority. It also propose that the 2015 Review Conference establish an ad hoc committee to work on the illegality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances and the urgent need for the full realization of the right and the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances from all the five nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. As a first step to address the twin issues of the illegality of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and negative security assurances, we continue to believe that the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited under all circumstances and all the five nuclear-weapon States shall undertake to refrain, under all circumstances, from the use and threat of use of such weapons against any of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

29. The General Assembly, at its sixty-eight session, adopted resolution 68/35, entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", in which it called for, inter alia, practical steps to be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promoted international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

30. These required measures by the international community could be considered as a basis for the 2015 Review Conference for further elaboration.

31. In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates that maintaining the established delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital to preserving the credibility and integrity of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States.

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Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The first atomic bombs, dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945, had a destructive power 10,000 times larger than that of previous explosive devices. Since then, thermonuclear bombs, which are a thousand times more destructive than fission bombs, have been designed and built. The continued existence of thousands of such bombs in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States and the allocation of billions of dollars to modernize them have kept the fate of civilization and of humanity itself under horror and panic. Even with the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, humankind has continued to live under the shadow of the possible use of the world's most destructive mass-terror weapons. Therefore, the provision of unconditional security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been and still is an important and vital issue.

2. In the early 1980s, all five nuclear-weapon States, in response to the international demands for an unconditional and legally binding treaty on negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as a first limited step accepted some qualified and conditional undertakings not to use such weapons against States parties to the Treaty and those that had renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons. In early April 1995, this pledge was reaffirmed through unilateral statements by the nuclear-weapon States, and on 11 April 1995, just days before the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Security Council adopted resolution 984 (1995), in which it took note of these unilateral statements and recognized the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive assurances. The Security Council was also very explicit in considering that the resolution constituted a step in that direction.

3. The unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and the Security Council resolution were duly taken note of in a package of decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Paragraph 8 of decision 2 on principles

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and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament stipulated that further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that those steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

4. Moreover, the new doctrines such as the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, the development of easy-to-use mini-nuclear weapons and a recent increase in the number of cases in which some high officials of certain nuclear-weapon States have threatened non-nuclear-weapon States, such as the threats made by the United States and the President of France, have all put the non-nuclear-weapon States more than ever under the real threat of the possible use of nuclear weapons.

5. The United States, by developing new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons and, recently, allocating billions of dollars to the modernization of its nuclear arsenal, constructing a new facility for the production of nuclear weapons and naming non-nuclear-weapon States as targets of such inhumane weaponry, is acting in contravention of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations and is clearly violating its obligations under article VI of the Treaty and calling into serious question its commitment to its unilateral statement of 1995. Hundreds of millions of dollars have already been allocated to nuclear-weapon development projects such as those of the Trident programme of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland or the mini-nuclear weapons of the United States and, recently, the addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to French nuclear arsenals. The international community should not wait for the deployment or even the threat of use of such weapons to react. Such policies and practices seem to show that no lessons have been learned from the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is abhorrent that the threats and the dangerous doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States were officially proclaimed by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

6. The unilateral statements of 1995 and the subsequent Security Council resolution are inseparable parts of the deal at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The efforts undermining multilateral achievement in the field of disarmament are still seriously eroding the very credibility of the Treaty.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a positive step towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and should be complemented and strengthened through the provision, by all nuclear-weapon States, of unconditional and irrevocable legally binding assurances to all States parties to the treaties establishing such zones against the threat or use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran rejects the arguments stating that the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States are sufficient, or that the negative security assurances should be granted only in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Insistence on such weak arguments only results in the further weakening of the package of conditions for the conclusion and extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and places the credibility of the Treaty in jeopardy. In addition, given the geographical limitation of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security assurances guaranteed to States parties to the treaties establishing such zones cannot substitute for the universal, legally binding negative security assurances.

8. As the initiator of the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to firmly support the speedy establishment of such a zone. However, it is a matter of serious concern that the Israeli regime, through its continued refusal to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the only obstacle to the creation of such a zone. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran highlights the need to exert sustained international pressure on that regime to compel it to abide by the repeated calls by the international community to accede to the Treaty. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Sixteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Tehran, the Islamic Republic of Iran, from 26 to 31 August 2012, in its Final Document, commended the initiatives by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, pending its establishment, demanded that Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty or declared its intention to do so, renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty without precondition and further delay, promptly place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. It also expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should not imply political clout and the capability to shape and influence world events or change the decisions of sovereign States. Holding on to and expanding nuclear arsenals should be condemned rather than condoned or tolerated. Any increase in nuclear capability should equal a reduction in political credibility. As long as such weapons are in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States, no one on Earth will have any security. It is therefore imperative to move ahead with concerted and firm resolve to stop and reverse this fast-paced drive. Certain nuclear-weapon States have tried to create smokescreens in the international forums, including the Treaty review process, to deflect attention from their abysmal record and policies.

10. Pending the total elimination of these inhuman weapons, as stipulated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996, the Review Conference should announce unequivocally that to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons is illegal. At the same time, efforts for the early commencement of negotiations on effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances by all the nuclear-weapon States to all the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances should be pursued by the international community as a matter of priority.

11. Therefore, we propose that the 2015 Review Conference establish an ad hoc committee to work on the illegality of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances and the urgent need for the full realization of the right and the legitimate interest of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon States against the

use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. As a first step to address the twin issues of the illegality of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and negative security assurances, we continue to believe that the 2015 Review Conference should adopt a decision through which the Conference decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited under all circumstances and all five nuclear-weapon States shall undertake to refrain, under all circumstances, from the use and threat of use of such weapons against any of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

12. We strongly urge the upcoming Review Conference to move a step forward and make a concrete decision on negative security assurances in order to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, on a non-discriminatory and unconditional basis, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Joint statement of the P5 Beijing conference: Enhancing strategic confidence and working together to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review outcomes, Beijing, 14-15 April 2014

Working paper submitted by the P5

1. The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States, or P5, met in Beijing on 14 and 15 April 2014, under the chairmanship of China, to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, D.C. and 2013 Russian-hosted Geneva P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 Treaty Review Conference and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the Treaty, namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 also had a useful discussion with representatives of civil society during the conference.

2. The P5 reviewed significant developments made at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Treaty Review Conference, and in the context of the Treaty since the 2013 Geneva P5 conference. The P5 reaffirmed that the Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and that they remain committed to strengthening the Treaty. They emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the action plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference and reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, as provided for in article VI of the Treaty. The P5 intend to continue to seek progress on the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which is the only practical path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and in keeping with their Treaty obligations.

3. The P5 intend to strengthen their engagement to advance progress on Treaty obligations and 2010 Review Conference action plan commitments. The P5 advanced their previous discussions on the issues of transparency,confidence-building and verification, and welcomed the achievement under France's leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Review Conference Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014

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Preparatory Committee. They encourage other States parties to the Treaty to submit reports, consistent with action 20 of the Final Document.

4. The P5 reviewed the work carried out by the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, under China's leadership, and in this regard noted the success of the Second Experts' Meeting of the Working Group, held in Beijing on 26 and 27 September 2013, which established milestones for the completion of the first phase of the Glossary effort for the 2015 Review Conference. The progress made in this effort provides a solid foundation for the Working Group to submit its outcome on the terms currently under discussion to the 2015 Review Conference. The P5 stressed again the importance of this work, which is increasing mutual understanding and will facilitate further P5 discussions beyond 2015 on nuclear issues.

5. The P5 had an exchange of views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain a better understanding and build strategic trust. They also discussed the importance of verification in achieving progress towards further disarmament and ensuring the success of non-proliferation efforts. The P5 welcomed briefings by the Russian Federation and the United States of America on aspects of the New START Treaty's implementation, as well as on the implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons, signed in Washington, D.C. on 18 February 1993, and its related Protocol on Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Arrangements. The P5 shared further information on their respective experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

6. The P5 visited the Chinese National Data Centre for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, as an endeavour to enhance transparency and mutual understanding. They recalled their commitment in the 2010 Review Conference Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold their national moratoriums on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The P5 intend to continue their cooperative work to strengthen the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty verification regime. The P5 confirmed their support for the ad referendum arrangement for collaborative work by their Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty technical experts towards improved critical on-site inspection techniques and technology.

7. The P5 supported efforts to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament and continue to be concerned with the impasse at the Conference. They discussed efforts to find a way forward in the Conference on Disarmament and reiterated their support for a comprehensive programme of work, which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (fissile material cut-off treaty) for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 participated fully in the first session of the group of governmental experts on the fissile material cut-off treaty,

established in General Assembly resolution 67/53, and look forward to further engagement in this group.

8. In reaffirming the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressing the continued validity of this proven route, the P5 also emphasized their shared understanding of the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and their resolve to continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies, which is in the interests of all nations.

9. The P5 shared their views on topical proliferation issues and remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime. They pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international forums to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding issues faced by the non-proliferation regime. As they did previously, and looking ahead to the 2014 Preparatory Committee, they called upon the States concerned to fulfil without delay their international obligations under the appropriate Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other appropriate international commitments.

10. The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (article X). They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among States parties to the Treaty on the withdrawal issue at the 2014 Preparatory Committee, thus making a further contribution to the Treaty Review Process.

11. The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties as soon as possible. They also reiterated their support for the early convening of a conference, to be attended by all the States of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region.

12. The P5 discussed issues related to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. They stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective State factors. The P5 also discussed the role of the nuclear-weapon-States, in conformity with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in assisting IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programmes in non-nuclear weapon States.

13. The P5 noted that they are now more engaged than ever in regular interactions on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues. The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. In addition to meeting at all appropriate levels, the P5 intend to hold a sixth P5 conference. The P5 welcomed the offer by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to host this conference in London in 2015.

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Efforts to strengthen nuclear security

Working paper submitted by the European Union

1. Nuclear safety and security have always been absolute priorities for the European Union and its member States. Historically, the European Union member States have identified these topics as the cornerstone of all the work programmes of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) since its establishment in 1958. The recent nuclear accident at Fukushima, Japan, in 2011 has brought nuclear energy into the public spotlight and has brought a worldwide renewed focus in the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear security and emergency preparedness.

2. The present working paper describes recent European Union achievements and priorities in the security field, in particular the main developments which have occurred since 2010.

3. The European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security Strategy (2003), the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems, endorsed in 2008, together reinforce the European Union encouragement of robust nuclear security. In line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union requires the insertion of non-proliferation clauses into all its agreements with third countries. The accession of EURATOM to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was approved by the Council of the European Union in 2007, and ratification is expected to be completed soon by all member States and EURATOM.

4. The European Union encourages an international focus on nuclear security, including by its member States, through better cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and continues its support for the programmes of the Global Partnership Against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as well as for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The European Union contributes actively to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, including the working groups of the Implementation and

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Assessment Group. The European Union is one of the biggest contributors to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, with more than €40 million provided since 2004, in addition to voluntary contributions made individually by some of its member States. The latest Council Decision on the Union's support for activities of IAEA in the areas of nuclear security and verification, of 21 October 2013, provides €8.05 million to support nuclear security measures in third countries. Cooperation in the field of nuclear security has also been enhanced with our major partners.

5. Through EURATOM, the European Union also operates an effective regional nuclear safeguards system, implementing inspections, reporting and providing technical and scientific support to its member States in close partnership with IAEA. This resulted in the reaching of the "broader conclusion" of credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and in the achievement of integrated safeguards, in all European Union non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. The EURATOM Treaty can be used as a model of excellence by other regions worldwide interested in applying the concept of "neighbours checking neighbours". At the same time, the European Union implements a system of assurance of supply through its EURATOM Supply Agency. This model is consistent with the recent development of the "multilateral nuclear approach" concept.

7. In that framework, European Union efforts were undertaken, inter alia, in the following areas:

(a) Support for States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, South-East Asia, the Mediterranean Basin, Central Asia and Central Africa in the fields of border monitoring, nuclear forensics and anti-nuclear and radioactive trafficking action (including through the deployment of detection equipment), especially through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia and Instrument for Stability programmes, and the organization of training, tabletop exercises and online platforms for training for the States mentioned above, especially through the Joint Research Centre and European Union CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) Centres of Excellence;

(b) The development of European Union CBRN Centres of Excellence that currently regroup 44 partner States through the Instrument for Stability. They help the beneficiary States to implement coordinated regional strategies for the mitigation of and preparedness against CBRN-related risks. A total of €156 million is allocated to these Centres for the period 2014-2020.

8. In the area of combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials, significant progress has been made in recent years, both through the implementation of a European Union internal action plan on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security[1] and through outreach activities of the European Union under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument for Stability, with the latter delivering the recently created CBRN Centres of Excellence.[2]

[1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union — an EU CBRN Action Plan (COM(2009) 273 final (24.6.2009)).

[2] See http://www.cbrn-coe.eu/.

9. These approaches are in line with the recent conclusions of the IAEA "International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts", held in Vienna from 1 to 5 July 2013, and the Nuclear Security Summit process.

10. The European Union and its member States have developed particular expertise in the forensic analysis of nuclear and radioactive materials, and have implemented training programmes for first front-line responders and national experts in the detection and identification of nuclear materials. Special mention should be made of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group.

11. The export control of dual-use items is indirectly related to nuclear security, in the sense that it contributes to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The European Union has continued to develop its common regulatory framework, in the form of its European Union Dual-Use Regulation,[3] and to enhance its implementation.

12. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the European Council underlined the need to draw fully on the lessons to be learned, in particular with regard to on-site emergency preparedness and response.[4] European Union member States therefore undertook a comprehensive reassessment programme ("stress tests") of all nuclear power reactors to ensure that they are not at risk of similar extreme events. The assessments were carried out between 2011 and 2012 in the member States that operate nuclear power plants and also, on a voluntary basis, in European Union neighbouring countries operating, owning or planning to build nuclear power plants. The output from these stress tests yielded important lessons in the prevention and management of these types of severe accidents, and all European Union member States developed and committed to delivering an action plan to implement measures to address the findings of the stress tests. Additionally, the European Union nuclear safety Directive of 2009[5] is currently being discussed by the Council of the European Union to consider possible amendments to strengthen the Directive, in particular with respect to the independence of national regulators; nuclear safety objectives; topical peer reviews; transparency; and the provisions for on-site emergency preparedness and response.

13. Synergies between safety and security are possible, in particular in the area of emergency preparedness and risk mitigation, although both fields follow largely different purposes: while safety is founded on the principle of transparency, security is a fully sovereign competence of States based on confidentiality. For future installations, it will be important to address safety and security concerns from the start, at the conception and design phase, to provide robust response to both types of threats.

14. In the area of emergency preparedness, the European Union continues to rely upon its information exchange and reporting mechanisms: the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform. The data standards developed for the European Radiological

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[3] Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 2009:134/1).

[4] Conclusions of the European Council, 24/25 March 2011 (EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1), see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf.

[5] Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ L 2009:172/18).

Data Exchange Platform have been taken over by IAEA to serve as worldwide reporting mechanisms.

15. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism[6] continues to facilitate the expression of practical European solidarity towards countries affected by a disaster which is overwhelming their response capacity, including radiological and nuclear incidents. Reinforced in December 2013, the Mechanism now involves the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the European Emergency Response Capacity, which can effectively contribute to supporting increased preparedness at the European level as regards the consequence management of radiological incidents or nuclear accidents. It will be important that these mechanisms are strongly aligned with those of IAEA to ensure no duplication of resources.

16. Recognizing this progress, the European Union continues to encourage the further enhancement of nuclear security and to strengthen its commitment in this field.

[6] Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 924).

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Chair's summary: second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons

Nayarit, Mexico, 14 February 2014

Working paper submitted by Mexico

1. Delegations representing 146 States, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and civil society organizations participated in the second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which was held in Nayarit, Mexico, on 13 and 14 February 2014, to discuss the global and long-term consequences of any nuclear detonation, accidental or deliberate, from the perspective and concerns of twenty-first century society, including areas such as public health, humanitarian assistance, the economy, development and environmental issues, climate change, food security and risk management.

2. From the Chair's view, the broad and active participation of States and civil society reflects global concern regarding the effects of nuclear weapons, as well as increasing recognition that this is an issue of the utmost importance to all peoples in the world.

3. The Conference held in Nayarit expresses its gratitude for the participation of the victims and survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, as well as for the references made to the victims of nuclear tests.

4. The Nayarit Conference succeeded in presenting a facts-based approach to facilitate an informed discussion of these effects. Some key conclusions can be extracted from the presentations and discussion:

- The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation are not constrained by national borders — it is therefore an issue of deep concern shared by all.
- Beyond the immediate death and destruction caused by a detonation, socioeconomic development will be hampered and the environment will be damaged. Suffering will be widespread, with the poor and vulnerable most severely affected.

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- The reconstruction of infrastructure and the regeneration of economic activities, trade, communications, health facilities and schools would take several decades, causing profound social and political harm.
- Radiation exposure could result in short- and long-term negative effects on every organ of the human body and would increase cancer risks and future hereditary pathologies.
- Today, the risk of nuclear weapons use is growing globally as a consequence of proliferation, the vulnerability of nuclear command and control networks to cyberattacks and to human error, and the potential access to nuclear weapons by non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups.
- As more countries deploy more nuclear weapons on higher levels of combat readiness, the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional use of these weapons grows significantly.
- It is a fact that no State or international organization has the capacity to address or provide the short- and long-term humanitarian assistance and protection that would be needed in the event of a nuclear weapon explosion. Moreover, it would not be possible to establish such capacities, even if attempted.

5. Since the Nayarit Conference is a follow-up to the first Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (held in Oslo in March 2013), the above conclusions build upon those reached in Oslo.

6. The wide range of damage and negative impact of a potential nuclear explosion, as well as the vast resources allocated to maintain and modernize nuclear arsenals, make the mere existence of these weapons absurd and raise questions about the arguments in their defence; ultimately they are contrary to human dignity.

7. It is the Chair's perception that awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is already changing the hearts and minds worldwide of those engaging in discussions concerning nuclear weapons.

8. Actions such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and the achievement of a comprehensive outcome at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, together with the discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, are mutually reinforcing processes.

9. When it comes to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, no efforts are small. In this regard, many delegations underscored the positive impulse provided by the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament held in 2013.

10. The Chair expresses deep gratitude to civil society for its involvement and input in the Nayarit Conference, and calls on all Governments to forge new and renewed multisectoral partnerships with civil society to work towards mutually beneficial objectives.

11. The Chair warmly welcomes Austria's offer to host the third Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. This offer was received with great support from participants as a follow-up to Oslo and Nayarit, with a view to

building up the momentum, anchoring these conclusions and taking them forward. As expressed by many delegations, the Conference reiterates the invitation to nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty to participate in the third Conference in Austria.

12. In doing so, we need to take into account that, in the past, weapons have been eliminated after they were outlawed. We believe that this is the path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

13. In our view, this is consistent with our obligations under international law, including those derived from the Treaty, as well as from common article 1 to the Geneva Conventions.

14. The broad-based and comprehensive discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should lead to the commitment of States and civil society to reach new international standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.

15. It is the view of the Chair that the Nayarit Conference has shown that the time has come to initiate a diplomatic process conducive to this goal. Our belief is that this process should comprise a specific time frame, the definition of the most appropriate forums and a clear and substantive framework, making the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons the essence of disarmament efforts.

16. It is time to take action. The seventieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks is the appropriate milestone to achieve our goal. Nayarit is a point of no return.

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Efforts to strengthen nuclear safety

Working paper by the European Union

1. The European Union recognizes the right of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty and with due regard to articles I, II and III thereof, and remains committed to ensuring the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions.

2. The accident that occurred on 11 March 2011 in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was a major event in the history of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It will take several more years for the international community to draw all lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the efforts of all stakeholders in this regard must be maintained. In this context, education, training and knowledge management are of utmost importance in establishing an adequate nuclear safety infrastructure.

3. The European Union and its member States are dedicated to promoting the continuous improvement of nuclear safety on the basis of common objectives and references, both within the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and at the international level.

Within the European Atomic Energy Community

4. The EURATOM directive establishing a community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations was adopted on 25 June 2009. The objective of the directive is to maintain and promote the continuous improvement of nuclear safety. Member States shall provide for appropriate national arrangements for a high level of nuclear safety within the European Union. This directive contains provisions of utmost importance for nuclear safety, such as the obligation to arrange at least every 10 years for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authority and to invite international peer reviews in the field of nuclear safety. Two years later, on 19 July 2011, a directive establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive

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waste was adopted, creating a comprehensive legislative framework for both nuclear installations and radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

5. Furthermore, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, all nuclear power plants in the European Union underwent comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments (stress tests) and peer reviews in 2011 and 2012. These stress tests, led by the European Nuclear Safety Regulators' Group concluded that there were no technical reasons requiring the shutdown of any nuclear power plant in Europe, and identified a series of good practices and recommendations to be undertaken by operators of the member States, under the control of national regulators. Moreover, as requested by the European Council, a revision of the directive on nuclear safety is currently being discussed by the European institutions with a view to strengthening the regulatory framework for nuclear safety. The enhancements aim to ensure greater clarity on the measures needed to ensure the independence of the national regulatory authorities, provide for greater transparency on nuclear safety matters, formulate safety objectives for all nuclear installations in the European Union and, finally, reinforce the peer reviews mechanism.

6. It should be noted that directives set common rules and common basic standards. They do not prevent member States from adopting or maintaining more stringent provisions in their domestic laws.

At the international level

7. The European Union fully supports the central role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in coordinating international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety. The action plan on nuclear safety, adopted in 2011 by IAEA member States, identifies the fields where national and international efforts regarding nuclear safety are most needed. Progress on its implementation by the secretariat and member States of IAEA has been reached since 2011 and efforts in this regard should be maintained. After 2015, a common and long-term vision of actions needed to strengthen nuclear safety, shared by IAEA member States, should be maintained. To strengthen the coordination of the cooperation between EURATOM and IAEA, a memorandum of understanding on nuclear safety cooperation was signed in September 2013.

8. We underline the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, the management of waste in a safe and secure way, radiological protection and civil nuclear liability, and call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to all the relevant conventions as soon as possible and to implement fully the ensuing commitments. In particular, the European Union member States are committed to working towards a global civil nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing prompt, adequate and non-discriminatory compensation for nuclear damage. The European Union member States encourage the States that have not done so to give due consideration to the possibility of joining, as appropriate, the relevant international liability instruments.

9. The IAEA comprehensive report on the Fukushima accident, due for completion this year, will be important to further strengthening nuclear safety, and the European Union and its member States have continued to provide both in-kind and financial support to this important work. This report will provide a comprehensive and factual assessment of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi that addresses the causes, consequences and lessons learned.

10. The European Union and its member States encourage all States to seek continuous improvements to nuclear safety on the basis of the state of the art of scientific and technical knowledge to help to achieve the high levels of safety across the globe and as a minimum implement IAEA safety standards. The European Union member States are committed to the implementation of the code of conduct on the safety of research reactors as well as the code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and encourage all States to do so.

11. The European Union considers as a priority the universalization of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. So far, 65 States have signed and 77, including EURATOM as a regional organization, have ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 42 States have signed and 69, including EURATOM as a regional organization, have ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The European Union calls upon all States that have yet not done so, especially those planning to embark on a nuclear power programme or having recently commissioned a nuclear power plant for the first time, to sign and ratify these conventions without delay. We also encourage all contracting parties to actively engage in review meetings of contracting parties.

12. Strengthening the effectiveness of these Conventions is of utmost importance. In this regard, the European Union and its member States took a leading role in developing proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety during their recent sixth review meeting as a result of the Working Group on Effectiveness and Transparency, including the adoption of measures to enhance the review process and the convening of a diplomatic conference within one year to discuss one amendment to the Convention. The European Union and its member States are committed to increasing active participation of contracting parties in the review process of the Convention, to work towards promoting and implementing non-binding measures adopted by the sixth review meeting, such as the inclusion in the summary of national reports of a description of policies, plans and schedules for inviting international peer review missions and follow-up missions, and to voluntary report in national reports relevant information on the safety of other types of civilian nuclear reactors.

13. The European Union and its member States are currently, together, one of the largest providers of aid and assistance. As an example, it has consistently supported the promotion of nuclear safety worldwide, and has contributed €225 million over the period 2014-2020 through its instrument for nuclear safety cooperation. The projects funded by that instrument aim at supporting the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material. The member States have also allocated financial support for activities on nuclear safety to be implemented by IAEA under the Technical Cooperation Programme, which provides assistance to countries to upgrade their nuclear safety infrastructure and respond to emergencies. The European Union would also like to underline that the valuable contribution of various peaceful applications of nuclear energy to promoting the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals also depends on cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety.

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Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material in relation to article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as members of the Zangger Committee and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as additional co-sponsors

The co-sponsors propose to include the following language in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

(a) The Preparatory Committee notes that a number of States parties meet regularly in an informal group known as the Zangger Committee, in order to coordinate their implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty related to the supply of nuclear material and equipment. To this end, these States parties have adopted two memoranda, A and B, including a list of items triggering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, for their exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended. The Zangger Committee's memoranda also relate to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty insofar as the recipient State should recognize the items on the procedures and criteria from article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as a basis for its own export control decisions, including re-exports;

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(b) The Preparatory Committee endorses the importance of the Zangger Committee as guidance for States parties in meeting their obligation under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and invites all States to adopt the memoranda of the Zangger Committee as minimal standards in connection with any nuclear co-operation;

(c) The Preparatory Committee recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity and changes in procurement practices;

(d) The Preparatory Committee urges the Zangger Committee to share its experience on export controls, so that States may draw on the arrangements of its memoranda.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Memorandum of the Russian Federation for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the development of nuclear energy and the use of nuclear technologies for non-energy purposes. We believe that peaceful use of nuclear energy ensures reliable energy supply for human needs in the interests of sustainable development.

The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, held in June 2013 in Saint Petersburg under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that there was a broad consensus about a wider use of nuclear energy in the world given the strict compliance with the requirements of the international non-proliferation regime and nuclear safety and security. We intend to continue rendering assistance to all interested States regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Russian Federation fully complies with its international obligations on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety and security.

We appreciate the decisions of the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits and reaffirm our commitment to those decisions.

Global architecture of nuclear security

We proceed from the fundamental principle stating that the responsibility for establishing and maintaining a nuclear security regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

The Russian Federation is a party to all major international legal instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. We believe that the universalization of these legal instruments is an integral part of strengthening nuclear security in the world. We call upon all States to accede to them.

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We note that the non-participation of certain States with large inventories of nuclear materials in these fundamental international legal instruments inhibits further steps on the elaboration and adoption of new international legal documents and political commitments in the field of international cooperation on nuclear security and safety.

Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Russian Federation supports IAEA activities in the field of international cooperation aimed at strengthening nuclear security in the world. We take note of the assistance that the Agency provides to its Member States in strengthening their national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the systems of nuclear safety and security.

Starting from 2010, the Russian Federation has been paying voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

We believe that IAEA continues to play a leading role in establishing an interaction among States and exchanging experience on nuclear security and prevention of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

We suppose that the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts held in 2013 allowed its participants to analyse the experience and achievements of the international community in the area of strengthening nuclear security, to acquire a better understanding of the approaches used in the world to ensure such security and to identify future priorities in this area.

The Russian Federation welcomes the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017 approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency, focused on strengthening the coordinating role of IAEA in ensuring nuclear security, the wide use of information technology and modern developments and rendering relevant assistance to countries at their request.

Accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials

We believe that the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, as well as nuclear material accounting and control are among the most essential components for ensuring nuclear security.

In the Russian Federation, all nuclear materials, their storage sites and associated facilities, as well as transportation of nuclear material, are protected by the relevant security measures, including physical protection, at least at the levels recommended by IAEA in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Our nuclear security regulations are being continuously perfected.

There are no nuclear materials or facilities in the Russian Federation the level of physical protection of which gives ground to concerns. An effective nuclear safety and security system has been built and is maintained in the Russian Federation. The accounting for nuclear material, control of its physical inventory and effectiveness of its physical protection are inspected regularly by the competent security authorities and by the nuclear energy regulatory bodies.

The Russian Federation constantly works on developing and updating regulatory acts in the field of physical protection, nuclear and other radioactive materials accounting and control, taking into account the accumulated national

experience and the experience of other States and international organizations, including IAEA. In particular, in 2012, a new version of the federal norms and regulations "The basic rules of accounting for and control of nuclear material" was approved, imposing more specified and detailed requirements for the accounting for and control of nuclear material with due account for its category.

We call upon the countries participating in the Summit to develop a national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials and to ensure their effective physical protection.

Security in transport

For more than 15 years, the Russian Federation has applied the methods for verifying the declared contents during cross-border movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. We are ready to provide our support to other States concerned in mastering this technology.

Stationary systems have been established at our border checkpoints to exercise such control. Currently, we are introducing the national automated information system to control the cross-border movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials. In 2013, the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation together with IAEA twice organized international training courses on radiation detection techniques for customs service instructors and other law enforcement bodies from 15 IAEA Member States.

The Russian Federation is establishing an automated system of safe transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials, making it possible to locate vehicles carrying nuclear materials and assess their physical protection in real time. The system has significantly reduced the risk of nuclear material theft during transportation.

Countermeasures against the threat of nuclear terrorism

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to the coordination of international efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Given that the terrorist threat is a cross-border problem, we consider it necessary to strengthen the mechanisms of multilateral and bilateral interaction in this area taking into account the need to keep nuclear security-related information confidential.

In 2006, the Russian Federation and the United States of America launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which has become an effective cooperation instrument for sharing best practices in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security around the world. By now, 85 States have joined the Initiative.

In September 2012, the demonstration exercises on countering nuclear terrorism the Strazh-2012 (Guardian 2012) under the auspices of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, involving national means for detecting nuclear materials, were conducted in the Moscow region. Experts from more than 50 countries attended the event.

Prevention of illicit trafficking

We advocate that all States consistently implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) co-sponsored by the Russian Federation in 2004. The resolution provides the international legal basis for countering the threat of materials which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies and means of delivery falling into the hands of non-State actors, first of all terrorist organizations.

In addition to other measures to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Russian Federation is developing the state system to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials on Russian territory. Its technical implementation is under way in the Murmansk, Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk regions.

We support the IAEA programme on creating and maintaining the IAEA database on illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. We actively participate in working group meetings aimed at enhancing the performance of the database and in the information exchange; we also provide relevant information on a regular basis. The Russian Federation is developing a system of forensic laboratories to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and radioactive waste removed from illicit trafficking.

Upon the initiative of the Russian Federation, the eighteenth Meeting of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group was held in Saint Petersburg in 2013 with the participation of leading experts from laboratories, institutions and national research centres of Europe, America, Asia, Australia and Africa. This event turned out to be a most significant one since the establishment of the Group.

Radioactive sources

Being fully aware of the dangers posed by uncontrolled radioactive sources, the Russian Federation undertakes measures aimed at improving their accountability, control and physical protection system. The Russian Federation strictly follows the IAEA recommendations contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Laws and regulations on accountability, control and physical protection of radioactive sources and materials are being constantly improved taking into account both national experience in this area and the experience of foreign States and international organizations, including IAEA. Thus, in 2012, revised federal norms and rules entitled "Principal Rules for Accounting and Control of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Wastes in Organizations" were approved, setting requirements on accountability and control, taking into account, inter alia, the ranking of radioactive materials based on their potential to cause harm; in 2014, revised federal norms and rules entitled "Rules Regarding Physical Protection of Radioactive Materials, Sources and Storage Facilities" were adopted.

The radioactive source register is being kept and improved.

International programmes

We believe that the work on the repatriation of highly enriched uranium fresh and spent fuel from Russian- and American-built research reactors in third countries to the country of origin is an important area of cooperation aimed at increasing the level of nuclear security. The Russian Federation and the United States carry out this work with the participation of IAEA, which is reflected in the joint statement by the Russian and United States Presidents on nuclear cooperation of 6 July 2009.

Starting from 2002, we have implemented the programme on the repatriation to the Russian Federation of highly enriched uranium (both fresh and spent) from Russian-built nuclear research reactors alongside with the conversion of these reactors' cores from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium or their shutdown (decommissioning).

So far, the Russian Federation has removed all highly enriched uranium fuel from nine countries, namely, Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Viet Nam and Hungary.

Partly highly enriched uranium fuel has been returned from five countries — Germany, Poland, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Overall, since the start of the programme 790 kg of fresh (hereinafter regarding uranium) and 1,269 kg of spent highly enriched uranium fuel have been returned from 14 countries.

Fuel from Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Poland is planned to be repatriated.

We have conducted an assessment of six research nuclear reactors and confirmed the technical possibility of their conversion from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. At present, our efforts are focused on developing and certifying new high-density low-enriched uranium fuel needed for the conversion of relevant reactors in Tomsk and the Kurchatov National Research Centre. The decision about conversion would be made after an additional assessment of its economic impact.

Information security

Since the terrorist threat persists, we attach great importance to maintaining vigilance and improving the security of the information related to the protection of nuclear material and associated facilities and to enhancing the protection of automated management systems which influence the level of security at nuclear energy facilities. We are convinced that excessive transparency in this area may lead to dangerous consequences.

The Russian Federation supports the international efforts to ensure the protection of sensitive information, including the cybersecurity measures at nuclear facilities. In particular, the Russian Federation conducts annual training workshops on "Information Security in Automated Physical Protection Systems".

Nuclear security culture

The Russian Federation constantly works on fostering the nuclear security culture. In 2012, the guidelines for organizing and carrying out the work in the field of nuclear security culture were developed.

In November 2012 and December 2013, on the occasion of the Summits, the Russian Federation, jointly with IAEA, conducted workshops on nuclear security culture organized primarily for experts in the countries operating, building or planning to construct nuclear power reactors designed in the Russian Federation.

International cooperation

The Russian Federation continues to be interested in cooperation aimed at supporting and strengthening the capacities of third countries in the field of nuclear security. We help the countries that start using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in improving their nuclear security. We continue to conduct courses and workshops on physical protection at the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Institute of the National Research Nuclear University, MEPHI, in the city of Obninsk and at the Tomsk Polytechnic University. International workshops and conferences and training courses on nuclear materials control and accounting are regularly held at the Russian Methodological and Training Centre on Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting in Obninsk. Russian experts are actively engaged in developing and improving the IAEA international instruments on nuclear safety and security and holding the IAEA training courses in this field.

We recognize the importance of international cooperation in the sphere of nuclear security in compliance with national legislation, provided that the information is kept confidential and is prevented from falling into the wrong hands. In this context, we consider it desirable to develop cooperation in this area among industrial organizations of different countries working in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, since they play an important role in ensuring nuclear security.

The Russian Federation remains committed to maintaining and strengthening nuclear security and confirms its willingness to take an active part in international efforts to achieve these goals, as well as to work actively and substantively with all interested States that are aiso committed to these goals.

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Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Working paper submitted by China

Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are important components of global nuclear governance with an impact on global and regional peace and stability, as well as the security of all States and the well-being of all people. All parties should focus on global nuclear governance in order to build consensus, enhance cooperation and promote nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a comprehensive, balanced and steady manner. China's basic positions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are as follows:

1. By enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we can help achieve the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a comprehensive manner and carry forward the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

2. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation are complementary to each other. Efforts to promote non-proliferation should not impair the legitimate rights of all countries, especially the developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the same time, proliferation activities under cover of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be prohibited. We should also be concerned about the imbalance between supply and demand of nuclear material in some countries, and take effective measures to rectify this situation.

3. Promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and relevant international cooperation is one of the key goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Developed countries and IAEA should enhance assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on their actual needs.

4. IAEA should maintain an appropriate balance between safeguards and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to help ensure that its various activities enjoy the support and participation of all its members. Adequate resources should be ensured for IAEA activities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technical cooperation activities. All member States should make full and timely payments to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

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5. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy are important to meeting energy needs, ensuring energy security, and addressing climate change. China is developing its nuclear power industry with high efficiency but with nuclear safety as a prerequisite and has developed several nuclear power technologies independently. China would like to share its experience and provide all-round support and assistance to countries that use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

6. Nuclear safety is a guarantee for the sound development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By learning from experience and from the lessons of nuclear accidents worldwide, China is constantly strengthening nuclear safety measures, rigorously promoting the development of nuclear safety codes, regulations and emergency systems and paying continuous attention to any potential impact of nuclear facilities and activities upon the environment, society and the public.

7. Strengthening nuclear security is of great significance for ensuring the sustainable development of nuclear energy. All countries must follow a rational, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear security and build an international nuclear security system based on fairness and mutually beneficial cooperation, embodying the principle of placing equal emphasis on development and security, on rights and obligations, and on individual and collaborative efforts. All countries have an obligation to provide physical protection for nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in their territories and ensure the balanced and sound use of sensitive nuclear materials. They must work to consolidate the current international legal framework for nuclear security in order to strengthen international cooperation in this field. They should also take an active part in the Nuclear Security Summit and the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security. IAEA should continue to play a leading role in the area of nuclear security.

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Nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear issues in the Middle East

Working paper submitted by China

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and an important component of global nuclear governance. China's position on nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear issues in the Middle East is as follows:

1. Efforts by relevant countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones based on article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the guidelines on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 should be actively supported. All the nuclear-weapon States should undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones and should conclude an international legal instrument in this regard. They should respect the legal status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and sign and ratify the protocols of the relevant treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Concrete measures should be taken to implement relevant security assurances.

2. While facilitating reconciliation and cooperation among the Middle East countries and promoting the Middle East peace process, the international community should continue to attach importance to and support relevant proposals and efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and relevant provisions of the final documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences should be effectively implemented. Efforts to promote the early convening of the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should continue.

3. Israel should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and fulfil its obligations. The States concerned in this region should sign and ratify comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and should be encouraged to sign and ratify the additional protocol.

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4. The Iranian nuclear issue has a direct bearing on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and on peace and stability in the Middle East. The achievement of a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations will inject new energy into enhancing comprehensive nuclear governance in the Middle East. Diplomatic efforts should be intensified and concerns should be addressed with a view to promoting dialogue in a practical manner and achieving an agreement at an early date.

5. The international community should fully endorse the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and support the States parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and nuclear-weapon States in reaching agreement on the remaining issues of the Protocol and promoting its early signing and entry into force.